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Preface
The AICPA’s program of self-regulation,
the focus o f the Public O versight B oard’s re
sponsibility, is a recent and little know n addi
tion to the activities of the public accounting
profession. M any people who should do n o t
even know o f its existence. Few u n d erstan d it
thoroughly. M any w ho benefit from its activi
ties possess b u t a partial knowledge o f its
workings.
M em bers o f the Board, som e o f w hom
were involved in the program ’s developm ent,
have observed changes in the self-regulatory
program of the accounting profession, b o th
in concept and practice, as those w ho pio
neered its im plem entation learned from ex
perience w hat will and will n o t work, w hat is
and is n o t needed, w hat can and cannot be
accom plished.
Six years is little enough in the history o f
m ost e n d u rin g institutions. Yet because of
the substantial efforts that preceded the pres
ent program for au d it quality, the com m it
m en t o f participants, and the excellence o f
leadership, self-regulation of the accounting
profession has com e a long way.

The Board believes its report for 1983-84
should include n o t only its rep o rt on the
activities of the past year b u t also a full descrip
tion of the self-regulatory p rogram as it exists
today and the way in w hich self-regulation is
viewed by those involved in its oversight This
booklet fulfills the latter objective: a descrip
tion of the nature, scope, an d com plexity o f
the accounting profession’s self-regulatory p ro 
gram, and the way in w hich th at program
com bines with other regulatory efforts to pro
vide m axim um protection to the financial
and investing public. We do so b o th to clarify
the extent o f the Board’s responsibilities, as
we see them , an d to draw attention to the
profession’s efforts and the dedication o f its
m em bers. Perhaps even m o re im portant, we
desire to share with others what we have learned
ab o u t professional regulation.
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Introduction
In 1977, the accounting profession embarked on
a program for increasing the basis for reliance by
the financial public on audit opinions. It was a
unique experiment because no other profession
had then, or has since, adopted a comparable
program.
The new program called for additional con
trols over the accounting profession. Those con
trols were self imposed, conceived in controversy,
implemented under surveillance, and exist today
not without criticism. Nevertheless, the program
as it now stands is an extraordinary achievement,
although it is little understood by many members
of the profession and virtually unknown to its
major beneficiaries.

Nature of Professional Regulation
During this relatively brief period, the ac
counting profession has learned a great deal about
the nature of professional regulation. Experiences
gained during the successful operation of the pro
gram over the past six years have provided valuable
insights, new perspectives, and a clearer under
standing of the nature of regulation and the roles
that different organizations play in attaining it
Regulation of professional practice is applied
at three levels: by the firm, by the profession, and
by government Each has the same goal— satis
factorily reliable accounting and auditing services
to society. However, each of the three uses dif
ferent means to achieve the desired goal. One
means of reaching that goal is to punish persons
found guilty of fraudulent or otherwise unaccept
able service. This is usually accomplished at the
government level by action in courts of law, and
by authorized regulatory and licensing agencies.
A second means of attaining the goal is educa
tional in nature, and consists of the establishment
of professional standards, conveying these to
members of the profession, and assisting prac
titioners in complying with them. This is usually
accomplished within the profession by pro
fessional societies and by individual practitioners
and firms. Thus, punishment and education are
two diverse approaches by which the goal of ade
quate public protection is sought

Within a professional firm, steps must be
taken to assure that its work measures up to the
expectations of clients and others, or the firm will
soon have diminished opportunity to serve. In
large measure, such expectations are established
by the general level of work of competing firms.
Thus, competitive pressure, working through the
firm, is the prime mover for regulation at the
firm level.
Private regulation at the firm level is seldom
thought of as “ regulation.” Yet, more than any
other influence for the improvement of pro
fessional practice, private regulation is present
and working. Self-interest should lead a firm’s
management to rid itself of the incompetent, the
negligent, and the untrustworthy. It is at the firm
level that most continuing education takes place,
that practitioners learn of new standards, develop
ments, and opportunities for improved service. It
is also at the firm level that inadequate perfor
mance of professional duties is most likely to ter
minate a practitioner’s career.
Additional regulation takes place at the level
of the profession. Professional organizations
generally have as one of their most important
goals the elevation of the quality of professional
performance. Ethical and other standards, con
tinuing education programs and professional
meetings, and provisions for censure and expul
sion from membership are educational and puni
tive efforts used to improve a profession’s service
to its various publics. The tie between pro
fessional or peer regulation and private regula
tion is a close one. Through acquaintances made
at professional meetings and programs, prac
titioners learn of new practices and procedures
found useful by others and by adopting these they
improve the quality of their own firm’s work
The third level of regulation—public regu
lation—is imposed by government in a variety of
forms. Qualifying examinations, licensing pro
visions, regulatory requirements, all represent
efforts by governmental authorities to assure satis
factorily reliable service to the public. Additionally,
government regulation is characterized by inves
tigations, legal actions, negotiated settlements,
injunctions, and punishm ent
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To many people, the term “regulation” brings
to mind preeminently punishment of those found
guilty of unsatisfactory conduct and to them regu
lation, to be effective, must have the characteris
tics of government regulation. It is much more
useful and much more accurate to view regula
tion in its totality with private and professional
regulation having roles that are equally as impor
tant to that of government in attaining the goal of
meeting society’s needs.
To be sure, public regulation has unique
and important capabilities not shared by private
and professional regulation. The power of sub
poena, the ultimate authority of government, the
traditions and practices of the judicial system,
and the rules for assuring fair treatment of all par
ties to a dispute assure effectiveness and equity
well beyond the power or ability of either private
or professional regulation. On the other hand, for
instance, the capacity of professional organiza
tions and private firms to provide educational op
portunities far exceeds anything government is
likely to find feasible. Chart A broadly sum
marizes the activities at the various levels of regu
lation of a profession.
For these reasons, regulation of a profession
requires the best efforts at all three levels. No one
level of regulation is adequate alone. Indeed, no
one of them can substitute for any other. If society’s
needs are to be served, all three must be involved
and be effective.
This report describes how these regulatory
efforts operate and interrelate, and summarizes
the manner in which the Division for CPA Firms
of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants contributes to professional regulation.

Genesis of the AICPA Program
During the decade of the 1970s, some mem
bers of Congress and the Securities and Exchange
Commission expressed concern regarding the
credibility of financial statements issued by pub
licly-owned corporations and the reliability of
audit reports thereon issued by independent ac
counting firms. In the resulting discussions with
representatives of the accounting profession, at
tention was focused on the manner in which the
profession was organized, regulated, and dis
ciplined. While the adequacy of financial account
ing standards and the accounting standard-setting
process were also questioned, most of the criticism
centered on the performance of independent ac
countants and the audit process.
In the view of its most vocal critics, the ac
counting profession was of considerable public
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CHART A

Levels o f Professional Regulation

Levels

Activities

Private regulation
by firms

Education
Market discipline
On line, real time supervision

Peer regulation
by professional
societies

Professional standards
Education
Organizational discipline

Public regulation
by government

Permission to practice
Civil litigation
Investigation and punishment of
violators of laws and regulations

importance but unregulated. On the other hand,
many accountants thought adequate control exis
ted through the SEC, state boards of accountancy,
the profession’s code of ethics, and the common
law governing contractual relationships. They ar
gued that individual accountants and firms were
not free to do whatever they pleased because
competitive forces encouraged discipline within
firms, and the judicial system appeared entirely
adequate to hold accountants accountable when
investors suffered losses, allegedly because of
auditing or accounting failures. However, these
arguments did not satisfy the profession’s critics.
Peer regulation had existed for many years,
commencing in 1887 when the first society of
independent accountants was formed. Named
the American Association of Public Accountants,
it was the direct predecessor of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants. At that
time, the public accounting profession consisted
chiefly of sole practitioners operating out of single
offices with few or no professional staff. Conse
quently, the professional organization’s rules were
then and continued to be applicable to individual
practitioners, not firms.
As business enterprises grew and expanded
across state and national boundaries, the public
accounting firms servicing their needs also ex
panded, many into larger and then into multiple
offices, and some into complex multinational
organizations consisting of hundreds of practice
offices and thousands of professionals.
During this period of dramatic change in the
practice of public accounting and in the size of
accounting firms, the organizations concerned
with peer regulation of accountants did not foresee
a need for, and therefore did not create, a mecha
nism to regulate public accounting firms. Rules
of conduct of state societies of CPAs, as well as
those of the AICPA, continued to deal only with

the conduct of individual members. Not until
1977 did the AICPA create a mechanism to regu
late firms.
In that year, responsive to public and Con
gressional criticism, and over the objections of
many accountants, the Council of the AICPA—its
governing body—accepted the challenge and es
tablished a Division for CPA Firms. The Division
consists of two sections, an SEC Practice Section
(SECPS) and a Private Companies Practice Sec
tion (PCPS). Membership in either section is vol

CHART B

untary. These sections provide the organizational
structure for the present peer regulation of the
activities of member firms. See Chart B.
The Public Oversight Board, independent of
the Division, whose members were to be “drawn
from among prominent individuals of high integ
rity and reputation” was formed to oversee the
activities of the SEC Practice Section and repre
sent the public interest in the performance of its
oversight function.

Organization o f the Division for CPA Firms

Division
for
CPA Firms
Public
Oversight
Board

SECPS Member Firms

PCPS Member Firms

PCPS
Executive
Committee

Peer Review
Committee

Technical
Issues
Committee
**

Securities
and
Exchange
Commission

Joint
Coordinating
Committee
****

Member
Services
Committee
***

SECPS
Executive
Committee

Peer Review
Committee

Special
Investigations
Committee

* The SEC has oversight of the profession in general. The Public Oversight Board generally serves as a liaison between the Securities

and Exchange Commission and the SEC Practice Section and coordinates access by the SEC to selected peer review and Board
workpapers.
* * The Technical Issues Committee monitors AICPA technical committees and develops recommendations to these groups from the
perspective of accountants who serve private companies.
* * * The Member Services Committee develops and administers a program of PCPS member services.
* * * * The Joint Coordinating Committee was recently formed to facilitate coordination between the two sections in identifying and dealing with
common problems.
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Components of the Regulatory Process
A full program of regulation of accountants and
accounting should include provisions for the
following:
■ Admission o f qualified people to professional
practice.
■ Establishment o f generally accepted accounting
principles and professional standards for account
ing and auditing services and quality control.
■ Continuing education for practicing accountants in
accounting principles and professional standards.
■ Periodic and regular determination of compliance
with professional standards.
■ Investigation of alleged deficiencies in complying
with professional standards.
■ Punishment of those found guilty of unacceptable
practices.
■ Maintenance of adequate competition.

Chart C illustrates how all these varying
requirements are provided for. Note that all three
levels of regulation are required if these goals are
to be achieved.
CHART C

Private Regulation
The management of a public accounting firm
has the responsibility to prescribe appropriate
operating policies and practices. To be viable, the
firm must be competitive in its market area and
ensure that its policies and practices are in accor
dance with standards established by rule-making
bodies such as the Auditing Standards Board of the
AICPA, the Financial Accounting Standards Board,
and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In addition, the AICPA Quality Control
Standards Committee in 1979 established a set of
quality control standards governing the account
ing and auditing practices of accounting firms.
Each section of the Division for CPA Firms requires
its members to adhere to these standards. Thus,
each member firm must establish, maintain, and
enforce quality control policies and procedures
that provide reasonable assurance of compliance
with professional standards in the conduct of its
accounting and auditing practice. These quality
control standards are discussed at some length in
a later section of this report

Scope o f Regulation o f CPA Finns

Level

R egulatory Organizations

Principal Activities

Public
Regulation

Federal and State Regulatory Agencies

License qualified firms and individuals to practice public
accounting
■ Regulate firms and individuals in practice of public
accounting
■ Enforce laws and regulations
■ Punish violators of laws and regulations

Federal and State Courts
State Boards of Accountancy
Peer
Regulation

AICPA and State CPA Societies
AICPA Division for CPA Firms
Voluntary Associations of CPA Firms
Private Sector Accounting Standard-Setters
Financial Accounting Standards Board
Governmental Accounting Standards
Board

■ Promulgate and enforce rules of professional conduct
■ Establish accounting principles and standards for
accounting and auditing services and quality control
■ Develop and offer continuing education programs
■ Administer peer review programs
■ Investigate alleged audit failures
■ Discipline those who violate rules of professional conduct

Private
Regulation

CPA Firms and Practitioners

■ Development and enforcement of quality control policies
and procedures
■ Continuous training of firm personnel
■ On-line supervision
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Regulation of the day- to- day actions of part
ners and staff members is accomplished more
effectively and persuasively by firm management
than by any other participant in the regulatory
process. Disciplinary measures applied within a
firm are rarely publicized outside the firm. None
theless, in our opinion, they are extremely effec
tive. Responses to inquiries of firm representatives
made by the Special Investigations Committee of
the SEC Practice Section suggest that private regu
lation is generally direct, immediate, and aimed
at improving the quality of service to clients. Con
trol over employment and compensation pro
vides effective authority. Persons judged to be
inadequate in performance of their professional
responsibilities may be demoted, transferred, or
terminated. Those who do well are rewarded. In
some cases, remedial measures can be instituted
to improve personnel performance, to draw atten
tion to policies and established practices, or to
strengthen policies and procedures judged to be
in need of improvement
For many firms, pride and professionalism
undoubtedly provide sufficient incentive to mon
itor performance of partners and staff members
as well as to establish and implement effective
policies and practices. However, added incentive
is provided by competitive forces in the market
place and by the desire to avoid the damage to the
firm’s reputation and the other penalties that
accompany litigation alleging noncompliance with
professional standards. Thus, much of the moti
vation for private regulation comes from within
the firm and is directly related to its economic and
professional success.

Peer Regulation
Peer regulation can occur only when prac
titioners, through firms or individually, affiliate
with an organization that has as one of its pur
poses the upgrading of professional performance.
In accounting, membership in such organizations
has always been voluntary so that acceptance of
peer regulation is a voluntary act. Independent
accounting firms that join the Division for CPA
Firms make a serious commitment to comply
with all professional standards and to make public
specified information about themselves. The most
far-reaching membership requirement—and the
one that permits both sections to obtain assurance
that a member firm is complying with professional
standards—requires the firm to have the ade
quacy of its quality control system for its account
ing and auditing practice and its compliance with
that system reviewed by independent peers every

three years and to make public the report issued
by the reviewers.
Without question, peer review is the centerpiece of the program of peer regulation of the
Division for CPA Firms. A peer review is carried
out under the supervision of a carefully selected
committee. In addition, peer reviews of SECPS
member firms are reviewed by members and staff
of the Public Oversight Board. Independent peer
reviewers evaluate and test the firm’s quality con
trol system to determine whether it is suitable and
appropriate for the firm’s accounting and audit
ing practice and whether it is being complied
with. In the course of the review, the reviewers
examine the financial statements and the audit
report and workpapers and other documentary
material related to selected accounting and audit
ing engagements to determine whether the firm’s
personnel complied with professional standards
in performing their work In that connection, the
firm’s quality control policies and procedures
must be sufficiently comprehensive to provide
reasonable assurance of conformity with all
appropriate professional standards. The review
procedures have been thoughtfully designed and
tested to enable the reviewers and the Section’s
Peer Review Committee to determine whether
the firm has an acceptable quality control system
for its accounting and auditing practice.
Members of the Section must report all liti
gation involving the firm or its personnel that
alleges an “ audit failure” with respect to an SEC
registrant A special committee (the Special Inves
tigations Committee) reviews each such case to
consider whether the allegations indicate the need
for corrective action by the firm or for recon
sideration of professional standards.
The programs of the Peer Review and Spe
cial Investigations Committees complement and
supplement one another. Peer review determines
(1) the existence and adequacy of the reviewed
firm’s quality control system and (2) on a sam
pling basis, the extent to which the firm’s person
nel comply with it. The Special Investigations
Committee follows up when specified allegations
indicate that there is possibility that a firm’s quality
control system and compliance with it may not be
as effective as the peer review may have found
them to be. Together the peer review and special
investigative processes provide the public with
additional assurance that member firms are ap
plying rigorous professional standards in the con
duct of their accounting and auditing practice. All
activities of the Section are actively monitored by
the Public Oversight Board.
Some regional and local firms band together

9

in associations in order to facilitate such matters
as correspondent relationships, continuing edu
cation, consultation on technical issues, policy
formulation, and compliance with standards.
Member firms maintain their own identities,
operate under their own names, and sacrifice
little, if any, authority as a requirem ent of mem
bership. There now are over twenty such associa
tions, many of them international in scope. Some
associations require their members periodically
to subject their accounting and auditing practice
to peer review by other association members. The
Division accepts intra-association peer reviews as
long as they meet certain requirements established
by the Peer Review Committees of each section.
Like private regulation, peer regulation is
positive, continuing, and effective. The peer regu
latory program of the Section reaches virtually all
firms that have a significant SEC practice. Its
primary goal is to improve future practice, not to
punish mistakes of the past Punishment in the
form of a sanction by the Section is properly
limited to situations when the firm fails to under
take corrective action considered necessary by the
Section. In this connection, it is well to point out
that institution of the Division’s self-regulatory
program has not diminished in anyway the already
existing forms of government regulation. The
Institute’s program represents an addition to, not
a substitute for, any regulation already existing.

Public Regulation
Government or public regulation of accoun
tants is intended to protect the investing public
from fraud, gross negligence, or failure to comply
with the laws and regulations that relate to inde
pendent audits of financial statements. Persons
found guilty of noncompliance with minimum
standards of performance established by law are
subject to punishment which generally takes the
form of damages to those claiming injury, public
censure, injunction, suspension, bar from prac
ticing before the SEC, or temporary or perma
nent loss of license to practice.
To many people, government regulation
constitutes the regulatory model. To these peo
ple, unless, an organization’s efforts are directed
to identifying, convicting, and punishing those
who have failed to meet the requirements of the
law or the expectations of society, its program is
not effective. But the Section’s program is not
designed to do that. Peer regulation properly cen
ters on strengthening systems of quality control
and improving the effective performance of audits.
Those who endanger or injure the investing public
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through willful fraud or gross negligence should
be apprehended and punished, but that task can
be left to the governmental regulators and courts
who do it quite well.

Interrelationship of Private, Peer,
and Public Regulation
Peer regulation is inextricably intertwined
with the two other levels of regulation governing
the practice of public accounting. All levels are
interrelated and each derives part of its effective
ness from roles played by the other two levels.1
Private regulation—policies and procedures
dictated and enforced by firm management—
plays a most significant role. Since the benefits of
private regulation flow directly to the owners of
the firm—and conversely since noncompliance
with professional and legal requirements directly
affects the owners adversely—private regulation
is potentially the most effective form of regula
tion. It can deal with problem areas immediately
and authoritatively.
The effectiveness of peer regulation is directly
commensurate with the num ber of firms that join
the program and agree to abide by its rules and to
have their actions judged by peers. Peer regula
tion, in effect, evaluates and publicly reports on
the effectiveness of private regulation. Peer regu
lation has several beneficiaries. The general public,
and especially the investing public, benefits by
receiving improved accounting and auditing ser
vices. Member firms enjoy the benefits that accrue
to membership in a prestigious, quality organiza
tion, especially the constructive criticism of peers.
The profession benefits in several ways: the pro
gram, by upgrading the quality of practice, reduces
the possibility of future audit failure and the resul
tant negative effects not only on the firms involved
but on the entire profession. Governmental regu
latory agencies are also direct beneficiaries of
peer regulation. As SEC Chairman John S. R.
Shad recently remarked:
“Improvements in the implementation of these pro
grams are enabling the [accounting] profession to
assume greater self-regulatory responsibilities and
permitting the Commission to limit its involvement
to an oversight role. ”2
1 Robert K. Mautz, “Self-regulation—criticisms and a response,”
Journal of Accountancy, April 1984.
J2 o h n S. R. Shad, Self Regulation of the Accounting Profession, an address
before the Eleventh Annual Conference on Current SEC Develop
ments, sponsored by the AICPA, January 10, 1984, Washington,
D.C.

Quality Control Standards
The quality of services of a CPA firm is dependent
in large part on its system of quality control. In
1979, the AICPA established quality control stan
dards governing the conduct of audit engage
ments.3 Thus, a firm of independent auditors
should establish quality control policies and pro
cedures to provide it with reasonable assurance of
conforming with generally accepted auditing
standards in its audit engagements. Generally
accepted auditing standards relate to the conduct
of individual audit engagements; quality control
standards relate to the conduct of a firm’s audit
practice as a whole.
Early in the formation of the self-regulatory
program, the importance of quality control stan
dards was recognized and adherence to them was
made a membership requirement of both the
SEC Practice Section and the Private Companies
Practice Section.

Elements of a System of
Quality Control for CPA Firms
A system of quality control for a CPA firm
has nine elements. They are:
■ Independence
■ Acceptance and continuance of clients

passes the firm’s organizational structure and the
policies adopted and procedures established to
provide the firm with reasonable assurance of
conforming with professional standards. The nature
and extent of a firm’s quality control policies and
procedures depend on a num ber of factors such
as its size, the degree of operating autonomy
allowed its personnel and its practice offices, the
nature of its practice, its organization, and ap
propriate cost-benefit considerations. The policies
and procedures with which peer review is con
cerned are those that apply to all auditing and
accounting services offered by the firm, typically
a significant part of its total services. The stan
dards are broad in nature, covering all of the
firm’s activities that have a bearing on the quality
of its accounting and auditing services.
The Section’s SECPS Manual provides con
siderable information on how a firm might establish
policies and procedures that will comply with the
quality control standards relating to each of these
components. Illustrative models of quality con
trol systems for firms of varying sizes are available
from the AICPA The following discussion includes
only sufficient explanation of each element of
quality control to provide an understanding of its
nature and importance and the emphasis each
receives during a peer review.

■ Hiring
■ Assigning personnel to engagements
■ Supervision
■ Consultation
■ Professional development
■ Advancement
■ Inspection

A system of quality control for a firm encom
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The elements o f quality control were identified in Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 4 and incorporated in Statement on Quality
Control Standards No. 1, System of Quality Control for a CPA Firm,
issued by the Quality Control Standards Committee, the senior
AICPA technical committee designated to issue pronouncements
on quality control standards.

Independence

The essence of an audit is the independent
examination of a company’s financial statements
for the purpose of providing a professional opin
ion regarding their conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles. Without inde
pendence, the opinion and the examination have
little validity or usefulness. Compliance with quality
control standards therefore requires member firms
to establish appropriate policies and procedures
to accomplish the following:
■ Instruct all professional personnel about the inde
pendence rules, regulations, interpretations, and
rulings of the AICPA, state CPA society, state board
of accountancy, state statutes, and, if applicable, the
Securities and Exchange Commission and other
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regulatory agencies; and require personnel to adhere
to such rules and regulations in the performance of
their duties.

measures employed to achieve a balance of engage
ment manpower requirements, personnel skills,
individual development, and utilization.

■ Confirm, when acting as principal auditor, the inde
pendence of another firm engaged to perform seg
ments of an engagement.

■ Designation of an appropriate person to be respon
sible for assigning personnel to engagements.

■ Monitor compliance with policies and procedures
relating to independence.
Acceptance and Continuance of Clients

Prudence suggests that a firm be selective in
determining its professional relationships. To
minimize the likelihood of association with a client
whose management lacks integrity, a firm should
adopt policies and procedures for deciding whether
to accept new clients or continue existing clients.
This usually includes:
■ Procedures for evaluation of prospective clients and
for their approval as clients.
■ Evaluation of clients upon occurrence o f specified
events to determine whether the relationship should
be continued.
Hiring

The quality of a firm’s work ultimately depends
on the integrity, competence, and motivation of
personnel who perform and those who supervise
the performance of the firm’s services. Thus, a
firm should adopt appropriate policies and pro
cedures regarding the following:
■ Maintaining a recruiting program designed to obtain
qualified personnel by planning for personnel needs,
establishing hiring objectives, and setting qualifi
cations for those involved in the hiring function.
■ Establishing qualifications and guidelines for eval
uating potential hirees at each professional level.
■ Informing applicants and new personnel of the
firm’s policies and procedures relevant to them.
Assigning Personnel to Engagements

Like other professional organizations, ac
counting firms include within their professional
staffs practitioners possessing varying degrees of
experience, knowledge, and skill. Policies and
procedures for assigning personnel to engage
ments therefore need to be established to provide
the firm with reasonable assurance that work will
be performed by persons having the degree of
technical training and proficiency required in the
circumstances. Policies related to this important
function generally cover
■ The firm’s approach to assigning personnel, in
cluding the planning of overall firm needs and the
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■ Provision for approval of the scheduling and staff
ing of each engagement by the person with final re
sponsibility for the engagement.
Supervision

Audits are typically performed by teams,
and members of those teams generally have dif
ferent levels of experience and skill. However,
one member of the team is assigned final respon
sibility for the engagement While that individual
is responsible for the supervision and review of
individual engagements, the firm is responsible
for establishing policies and procedures for the
conduct and supervision of work performed by
professional staff members at all levels to provide
reasonable assurance that the work performed
meets the firm’s standards of quality. The extent
of supervision and review required depends on
many factors, including complexity of the subject
matter, qualifications of the persons performing
the work, and extent of consultation available and
used. Firms need to consider providing guidance
on the following broad matters;
■ Procedures for planning engagements; this covers
matters such as background information to be ob
tained, development of work programs and time
estimates, and assignment of responsibility for
audit planning.
■ Procedures for maintaining the firm’s standards of
quality for the work performed; this includes mat
ters such as audit procedures manuals, standard
ized forms and checklists, and procedures for
resolving differences of opinion.
■ Procedures for reviewing engagement workpapers
and reports; this includes, among other things, con
sideration of the need for review by a second
partner.
Consultation

The great variety of professional skill, know
ledge, and experience within a CPA firm is matched
by the variety and complexity of the accounting
and auditing problems faced by staff members.
When a member of the professional staff, includ
ing partners, meets with a problem that is new or
involves unusual complexities, consultation with
more skilled, knowledgeable, or experienced
associates helps avoid the possibility of error or
other inadequacies. Quality control standards

require that appropriate policies and procedures
for consultation be established to provide the
firm with reasonable assurance that its personnel
will seek assistance, to the extent required, from
persons having appropriate levels of knowledge,
competence, judgment, and authority.
The nature of arrangements for consultation
within a firm depends on a number of factors
including the size of the firm and the levels of
knowledge, competence, and judgment possessed
by the persons performing the work. In deciding
on the consultation policies and procedures ap
propriate for its practice, a firm is expected to give
consideration to the following objectives:
■ Identification of areas and specialized situations
where consultation is required, and encourage
ment of personnel to consult with or use authorita
tive sources on other complex or unusual matters.
■ Designation of individuals to serve as authoritative
sources, with definition of their authority in con
sultative situations.
■ Establishment of procedures for resolving differ
ences of opinion between engagement personnel
and designated consultants.
■ Specification of the nature and the extent of docu
mentation necessary to record the results of con
sultation in those areas and specialized situations
where consultation is required, and for other con
sultations as well.
Professional Development

Because business and accounting are both
dynamic activities involving innovation and change,
continuing professional education is a necessity
to keep practitioners abreast of new develop
ments and to assist staff members to acquire the
knowledge and skills they need for advancement
Appropriate professional education and training
activities enable a firm to provide its personnel
with the knowledge required to fulfill respon
sibilities assigned to them and to progress within
the firm. Because of the importance of continuing
education to the continued performance of quality
product, a firm should:
■ Establish guidelines and requirements for the firm’s
professional development program and communi
cate them to all members of the professional staff.

■ Provide, to the extent necessary, programs to develop
expertise in specialized areas and industries in order
to meet the firm’s needs for such personnel.
■ Provide adequate and effective on-the-job training
during the performance of engagements.
Advancement

Practices in promoting and otherwise reward
ing personnel for satisfactory performance have
important implications for the quality of a firm’s
work. Quality control standards require a firm to
give consideration to its needs for measures that
■ Establish the qualifications deemed necessary for
the various levels of responsibility within the firm.
■ Evaluate performance of personnel and periodically
advise personnel of their progress.
■ Maintain personnel files containing documenta
tion relating to the evaluation process.
■ Assign responsibility for making advancement
decisions.
Inspection

Inspection is a review program conducted
within a firm under the direction of management
Compliance with policies and procedures related
to the eight other elements of the quality control
system is tested, and engagements from the firm’s
accounting and auditing practice are reviewed to
determine whether firm policies and procedures
have been applied appropriately. Such reviews
are typically conducted by partners or experienced
managers and constitute an important feature of
quality control. In multioffice firms, offices should
be inspected by teams from other offices. When
deviations from established practices are dis
covered, steps should be taken to assure that com
pliance is obtained in the future.
To assure that inspection is adequate, a firm
should establish policies that:
■ Define the scope and conduct of its inspection
program.
■ Provide for reporting inspection findings to man
agement and for monitoring any actions intended
to strengthen quality control.

■ Supply personnel with information about current
developments in professional technical standards
and encourage personnel to engage in self-develop
ment activities.
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T he Peer Review Process
Each member firm is required to subject its quality
control system to review by independent peers at
least once every three years. A peer review is
intended to evaluate (1) whether a firm’s system
of quality control for its accounting and auditing
practice is appropriately comprehensive and suit
ably designed for its needs, (2) whether its quality
control policies and procedures are adequately
documented and communicated to professional
personnel, (3) whether such policies and proce
dures are being complied with, and (4) whether
the firm is complying with the membership re
quirements of the Section.
A member firm is required to provide to the
review team the following background informa
tion: (1) documentation that describes or sum
marizes the policies and procedures constituting
its quality control system, (2) a description of the
firm’s organization (including an organization
chart), and (3) other descriptive material relating
to the elements of quality control and the firm’s
operations.

General Considerations
in a Peer Review
Administration of the peer review program
is the responsibility of the Section’s Peer Review
Committee. A peer review is conducted with due
regard for requirements of confidentiality imposed
by the rules of conduct of the code of professional
ethics of the AICPA. Care is taken to assure that
none of the reviewed firm’s clients are identified
in the workpapers or in any way made public.
The Review Team

A review team may be appointed by the
Committee, may be formed by a member firm
engaged by the firm under review, or may be
formed by an association or state CPA society
authorized to administer peer reviews. The review
team captain directs the organization and con
duct of the review, supervises other reviewers,
and is responsible for preparation of a report on
the review and, where applicable, suggestions for
improving the firm’s quality control system. Only
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partners currently involved in the audit function
are eligible to serve as review team captains.
All members of the review team must be
independent with respect to the firm to be reviewed.
Reciprocal reviews between firms are not permit
ted. Any relationship between the reviewed firm
and members of the review team that implies a
lack of independence is considered by the Peer
Review Committee.
Review teams must have knowledge of the
type of practice to be reviewed, including exper
tise in specialized industries in which the firm
practices. In the case of firms with SEC practices,
review teams must consist of persons who are
knowledgeable about current SEC rules and
regulations.
The review team is expected to carry out the
review in a professional manner similar to that of
an independent accountant examining financial
statements.
Performing the Field Review

A peer review has four distinct phases:
1. Study and evaluation of the firm’s quality
control system.
2. Review for compliance with the firm’s
quality control policies and procedures at
each organizational or functional level
within the firm, including review of workpaper files and reports for selected ac
counting and auditing engagements.
3. Review of the firm’s compliance with
membership requirements of the Section.
4. Preparation of a written report and, where
applicable, a letter on matters that may
require action by the firm.
Chart D provides an overview of the peer
review process.
Extent o f Review Team’s Tests

In a review of a multioffice firm, the selec
tion of practice offices for review needs to be suffi
cient to evaluate whether the firm’s quality control
policies and procedures are adequately com
municated to professional personnel and whether

they are being complied with. While the number
and location of practice offices to be selected
requires the exercise of judgment, guidelines to
aid the review team captain in making that judg
ment are contained in the SECPS Manual as
follows:
N um ber of offices
in review ed firm

2 to 15
Over 15

A pproxim ate num ber of
offices to be selected
for review

Largest office plus 1 to 3 offices
15% to 25% of the reviewed firm’s
offices (the selected offices should
contain similar percentages of the firm’s
professional personnel and the firm’s
accounting and auditing hours)

The number of offices and the accounting
and auditing engagements to be selected for review,
which reflects, among other things, a judgm ent as
to the percentage of accounting and auditing hours
to be reviewed, is affected by the size and nature
of the firm’s practice. The objective is to obtain a
reasonable cross-section of the firm’s practice
although greater weight is given to publicly-held
clients, to large and complex clients, and to initial
audit engagements. The review team’s evaluation
of the firm’s inspection program also affects the
selection process.
In evaluating the firm’s inspection program,
the review team considers such factors as whether
the inspection team’s workpapers adequately
document findings and conclusions, and whether
the report of the inspection team is consistent
with those findings and conclusions. The review
team tests the findings and conclusions of the
firm’s inspection team in order to determine whe
ther the firm is adequately monitoring its quality
controls and whether reliance can be placed on
the inspection function. These tests may be ac
complished by comparison of the findings of the
review team with those of the inspection team, by
direct observation of inspection procedures, or
by follow-up review of one or more offices in
spected by the inspection team.
The objectives of the review of engagements
are to evaluate (1) whether there has been com
pliance by personnel of the firm with its quality
control policies and procedures in the perfor
mance of accounting and auditing services and (2)
whether the quality control policies adopted and
procedures established by the firm are appro
priately comprehensive and suitably designed.
Guidelines for determining the extent of engage
ment testing are provided in the SECPS Manual:

N um b er of offices
in review ed firm

P ercentage o f review ed firm ’s
total accounting a nd auditing
hours to be review ed

1 to 15

5% to 10%

Over 15

3% to 6%

Chart D depicts the peer review process as it
relates to the review of selected accounting and
auditing engagements.
Review Team Workpapers

The review team members docum ent in
workpapers the review procedures performed
and their findings, including matters that indicate
deficiencies in the firm’s quality control policies
and procedures or significant lack of compliance
therewith. At the conclusion of the fieldwork, a
summary review memorandum is prepared that,
among other things, covers (1) the planning of the
review, (2) the qualifications of the review team
members, (3) the scope of the work performed, (4)
the findings and type of report to be issued together
with reasons supporting the report, (5) whether a
letter of comments is to be issued and if not, why
not, and (6) comments communicated orally to
management of the firm that were not deemed of
sufficient significance to include in a letter of
comments.

Reporting on Peer Reviews
Peer Review Report

The review team’s report includes a state
ment of the scope of the review, a description of
the general characteristics of a system of quality
control, and the team’s opinion— or a disclaimer
of opinion—as to whether the reviewed firm’s
quality control system met the objectives of estab
lished quality control standards and was being
complied with to provide the firm with reason
able assurance of conforming with professional
standards and the membership requirements of
the Section.
An unqualified report indicates the reviewed
team’s satisfaction with the firm’s system and with
compliance with the system and the membership
requirements of the Section. Most reports have
been unqualified.
A report is modified in the following circum
stances:
1. The review discloses significant deficien
cies in the firm’s quality control policies
and procedures.
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CHART D

O v e rv ie w o f P e e r R e v ie w P ro c e s s

Review of Firm’s Quality Control System

Review of Auditing and Accounting Engagements

Member firm selects
peer reviewer

Peer reviewers select
representative
engagements

Engagement letter
is prepared and signed

For each engagement
selected, reviewers review
report, financial
statements, and
engagement workpapers

Firm sends reviewer
required background
information

Each engagement is
reviewed for compliance
with technical and quality
control standards

Reviewer plans peer
review and sets scope

Reviewer discusses
findings on each engage
ment with responsible
firm personnel

Reviewer performs
review:

■ Evaluates adequacy of
firm's quality control
system
■ Tests firm ’s compli
ance with controls
which includes review of
selected auditing and
accounting engagements
(See Review of Auditing
and Accounting Engage
ments)
■ Interviews firm ’s
personnel to test knowl
edge of system

Were
any engagements
deemed materially
substandard?

Yes

No

No

Reviewer discusses
specific findings with
responsible firm personnel

Yes

Reviewer summarizes
findings

Yes
Will
report be modified or
adverse?

Reviewer consults with
Committee through the
staff of the AICPA Quality
Control Division

Yes

Reviewer communicates
results to firm at exit
conference

Does
firm agree to take
necessary
action?

No

Refer matter
to Committee

Does
firm agree to abide by
Committee’s
decision?

No

Refer matter to AICPA
Professional Ethics Division

Reviewer sends copy of
report, LOC, and selected
workpapers to Committee

Firm sends report, LOC,
and letter of response
(LOR) to Committee
Summarize results
Committee processes report, LOC, and LOR
(See Processing of Peer Review Reports and
Committee Follow-up Actions)
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Does
Committee agree
with reviewed
firm?

Yes

No

No

Reviewer issues final
report and letter of
comments (LOC) to firm

Should
reports be recalled or
additional auditing
performed?

Firm takes
appropriate action,
which is (a) reviewed
by peer reviewers or
(b) reported to
Committee, which
decides whether
follow-up action is
necessary

Yes

CHART D

C o n tin u e d

Processing of Peer Review Reports and Committee Follow-up Action

Firm sends report, LOC,
and LOR to Committee

Reviewer sends copy of
report, LOC, and specified
workpapers to Committee

AICPA Quality Control Division staff reviews material
for completeness and consistency

The report, LOC, and LOR, along with the staff’s
recommendations, are considered by the
Evaluation Subcommittee

Subcommittee decides on and reports its
recommendations
to full Committee

Committee acts on recommendations

Are
reports
consistent with
findings?

No

Yes

Is
there need
for follow-up
action?

Yes

Plan corrective or
follow-up action for peer
review findings

No

Discuss areas of concern
with reviewers

Place report, LOC, and
LOR in public file

Does
firm
agree?

Yes

Place report, LOC, and
LOR in public file

Reviewers change
reports, as needed

No

Monitor corrective or
follow-up actions

Consider recommending
sanction by
Executive Committee
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2. The review discloses a significant lack of
compliance with the firm’s quality con
trol policies and procedures.
3. The review discloses a significant lack of
compliance with the other membership
requirements of the Section.
4. The scope of the review is limited so as to
preclude the application of review pro
cedures considered necessary.
A modified report may express a qualified
opinion, or an adverse opinion, or it may include a
disclaimer of opinion. A qualified opinion iden
tifies significant deficiencies in the system or in
compliance with the system. An adverse opinion
indicates that the system is not adequate, that
compliance with the system is not adequate, or
both. A disclaimer of opinion is issued when
limitations placed on the scope are so significant
that the review team cannot form an overall opi
nion. No disclaimers of opinion have been issued
to date.
E xit Conference

Prior to issuance of its formal report, the
review team is required to communicate its con
clusions to the reviewed firm. Ordinarily, this
takes place at an “ exit conference” attended by
appropriate members of the review team and the
reviewed firm. The review team captain also notifies
the Peer Review Committee in advance of the
scheduled meeting in order to permit represen
tatives of the Committee and the Public Oversight
Board to attend the meeting if they so elect. The
Board’s policy is to attend exit conferences of all
firms with five or more SEC clients and, on a ran
dom sample basis, exit conferences of firms with
fewer than five SEC clients, including firms with
no SEC clients.
At an exit conference, the parties discuss the
review team’s conclusions, the report to be issued,
any matters that may require corrective action,
and other suggestions for improving the firm’s
quality controls. In the review of a multioffice
firm, an exit conference is held at the completion
of the review team’s work at each office. Board
members and staff also attend these conferences
on a random sample basis.
Letter o f Comments

During the course of the review, the review
team may discover matters that it believes require
action by the firm, either because modifications
in its practices would result in substantial im
provement in its quality control policies and pro

18

cedures, or in its compliance with them, or with
the membership requirements of the Section. A
letter of comments, therefore, is always issued
when the review results in a modified report
Such matters are candidly discussed at the exit
conference and are incorporated in a formal letter
of comments which is issued simultaneously with
the report on the peer review.
The reviewed firm is required to respond in
writing to each item included in the letter of com
ments. Its response describes actions taken or
planned with respect to each deficiency or recom
mended improvement noted. If the firm dis
agrees with the conclusions of the review team, its
response describes the reasons for such dis
agreement.
A letter ofcomments has been issued on over 90
percent of the reviews performed to date. See
Table 1. The best possible report a firm can
receive is an unqualified report with no letter of
comments. The Peer Review Committee care
fully considers the deficiencies discussed in a let
ter of comments and the firm’s response as part of
its evaluation of the appropriateness of an unquali
fied report and in deciding whether a qualified
opinion or an adverse opinion is appropriate
when a firm is found to have significant deficien
cies in its system or in compliance with the sys
tem. These evaluations and discussions require
mature and thoughtful judgment, because there
are no quantitative criteria that can be used to
measure the significance of perceived deficiencies.

Peer Review Committee Supervision
The Committee’s role in the peer review pro
cess is an active one. Chart D illustrates Peer Review
Committee processing of peer review reports. A
peer review report is not considered official
until it has been accepted by the Peer Review
Committee. Every report, letter of comments,
and accompanying response receives the atten
tion, first, of an evaluation subcommittee, and
subsequently the full Committee. Unqualified
reports not accompanied by a letter of comments
are accepted by the Committee only when the
Committee, upon review of the findings, concurs
that a letter of comments is unnecessary. If there
is an apparent inconsistency between a review
team’s findings and its report, the Committee
pursues the matter until resolved. For example,
the Committee may question the review team
about the factors it considered in deciding on the
type of report issued, may review the review team’s
workpapers, or may require the review team to

the overall self-regulatory program, the Board
and its staff devote a significant amount of time to
monitoring all aspects of the process. The Board’s
views are sought on all proposed changes and its
comments on individual reviews are considered
by the Committee in deciding on whether the
review was performed and reported on in accor
dance with standards.
Each peer review is subjected to direct Board
oversight Three levels of monitoring are used: (1)
review of the report, letter of comments (LOC),
letter of response (LOR), and selected review team
workpapers; (2) review of the report, LOC, LOR,
and all review team workpapers; and (3) all of the
procedures in (2) and observation of the review in
progress and attendance at the exit conference.

revisit the firm and perform additional pro
cedures to substantiate its conclusions.
If the Committee concurs with the report
issued and decides that no additional corrective
action is necessary, the report, the letter of com
ments, and the firm’s response are accepted by
the Committee. If corrective action on the part of
the firm is required but not yet taken, a Commit
tee member may be assigned to monitor the firm’s
implementation of its corrective action plan. When
the Committee has assurance that the necessary
corrective actions have been taken, the report is
accepted by the Committee.
In certain circumstances, the Committee ac
cepts a report only upon agreement by the firm in
writing to stipulated conditions, such as a revisit
by the review team or a Committee member to
review the corrective actions deemed necessary or
a requirement for another full scope review the
following year.
The Committee can and does exercise con
siderable influence in requiring improvements in
quality control when it considers such to be neces
sary. Much of the strength of the self-regulatory
program comes from the rigor with which the
Peer Review Committee performs its several
duties.

Public Access to Peer Review Reports
Upon acceptance by the Committee, the review
team’s report and letter of comments, together
with the reviewed firm’s response, are deposited in
files available to the public at the AICPA offices in
New York City. When a report is accepted subject
to stipulated conditions, relevant correspondence
or a memorandum to that effect is also placed in
the public file.
Table 1 is a summary of the findings of peer
reviews since the establishment of the Division
for CPA Firms.

Board Oversight

Because of the importance of peer review in

TABLE 1

Peer Review Reports A ccepted by the SECPS and
P CPS Peer Review Com m ittees Since Inception
TYPE OF OPINION
Unqualified

SEC Practice Section
Initial peer reviews
Subsequent peer reviews

Private Companies
Practice Section*
Initial peer reviews
Subsequent peer reviews
Combined Total for
Division for CPA Firms
Initial peer reviews
Subsequent peer reviews

Q ualified

Total

Adverse

No.

P ercent

No.

P ercent

No.

P ercen t

No.

P ercent

377
152
529

83.6%
93.3
86.2

61
10
71

13.5%
6.1
11.5

13
1
14

2.9%
0.6
2.3

451
163
614

100%
100
100

806
54
860

87.3
93.1
87.7

99
4
103

10.7
6.9
10.5

18
—
18

2.0
—
1.8

923
58
981

100
100
100

86.1
93.3
87.1%

160
14
174

11.6
6.2
10.9%

31
1
32

2.3
0.5
2.0%

1,183
206
1,389

1,374
221
1,595

100
100
100%

* The Public Oversight Board does not oversee the activities of the Private Companies Practice Section. These data regarding peer reviews of
this Section were obtained from the PCPS Peer Review Committee.
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Tables 2 , 3, and 4 are analyses of reviews
of SECPS mem ber firms. Table 2 shows a signifi
cant decrease in the num ber of firms receiving
modified reports in 1983 as com pared with
earlier years.

TABLE 2

Sum m ary of Types o f Peer Review Reports Issued
on 1983 SECPS Reviews and Since Inception of
the Program
Since
Inception

On 1983
Reviews

No. Percent

No. P ercent

Firms receiving unqualified opinion
with no letter of comments

51

Firms receiving unqualified opinion
and a letter of comments

478

77.8

116

82.3

Firms receiving qualified opinion

71

11.6

7

5.0

Firms receiving adverse opinion

14

2.3

1

0.7

614

8.3%

100%

17

TABLE 4

12.0%

141

Corrective Action Required by SECPS P eer
Review C om m ittee With R espect to
Substandard Audit Engagem ents Identified
in P e e r Reviews P erform ed During M ost
R ecent Three-Year Cycle

Number of audit engagements reviewed.................................3,247
95
(2.9% )

Corrective Action Required
Audit report recalled and financial statements revised
and reissued.............................................................................
Omitted auditing procedures performed .................................
Omitted auditing procedures— firm has not yet informed
Committee of actions to be ta k e n *.......................................
Cause of impairment of independence eliminated................
Questionable GAAS and GAAP treatment to be improved in
subsequent y e a r ......................................................................
Total ..........................
* Engagements identified in review processed by Committee in
March 1984.
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Type o f A ction Stipulated by the C om m ittee

N um b er o f
Follow -up Actions

7
9
16

100%

Number of audit engagements considered substandard
by peer reviewers ...................................................................

Sum m ary o f Com m ittee Actions to Assure
Im plem entation o f Quality C ontrol Improvements
in Connection with SECPS P eer Reviews During
the M ost R ecent Three-Year Cycle

Firms required to undergo an accelerated peer review:
Firms receiving adverse opinions............................
Firms receiving qualified opinions ..........................

Table 3 summarizes corrective actions required
by the SECPS Peer Review Committee during the
most recent three-year cycle regarding audit en
gagements found not to have been performed in
accordance with professional standards. Table 4

TABLE 3

summarizes follow-up actions required by the
SECPS Peer Review Committee during the past
three years to assure that firms made the necessary
improvements in their quality control systems.
Since the peer review requirement is triennial,
Tables 3 and 4 summarize generally the results of
all member firms except those that have joined
within the past few months.

17
12
3
4
59
95

Firms required to allow a revisit by peer reviewer
or Committee member to review effectiveness
of corrective action:
Firms receiving adverse opinions............................
Firms receiving qualified opinions ..........................
Firms receiving unqualified opinions with
letter of com m ents.................................................

1
9
8
18

As indicated, while the thrust of a peer review
is to identify deficiencies in a firm’s system of
quality control, the process also identifies engage
ments which are determined not to have been
performed in accordance with professional stan
dards. These instances are reported prom ptly to
the Committee, which follows up each instance to
ascertain that appropriate action is taken. In cases
where the financial statements were determined
not in accordance with generally accepted ac
counting principles, the firm recalled its report
and the financial statements were reissued, or if
the report was given limited distribution, the firm
agreed to cause the deficiencies to be corrected in
the subsequent year’s report.
In those instances where it was concluded
that the audit was not performed in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards, the
firm either immediately performed the omitted
procedures or agreed to perform them in a subse
quent imminent audit

Investigation of Alleged Audit Failures
No system of quality control can guarantee that a
firm will never issue an inappropriate report.
Management fraud, mistakes of judgment, mis
understanding of instructions, carelessness, and
other personal factors may result in “audit failures”
no matter how rigorous the system of quality con
trol. Neither can peer review, the heart of the
AICPA’s self-regulatory program, which is neces
sarily and appropriately performed on a sam
pling basis, be expected to disclose all personnel
failures. A peer review is designed to provide
reasonable, not absolute, assurance that the firm’s
accounting and auditing engagements are per
formed in compliance with professional standards.
Therefore, certain allegations of audit failure
are assigned for investigation to the Special Inves
tigations Committee which considers whether
they result from a “ people problem,” a systems
failure, or an inadequacy in professional stan
dards, and considers what steps, if any, need to be
taken to protect the public from a future failure.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has
made the following com m ent:
Although peer reviews provide no assur
ance that all audit failures will be identified
or avoided in the future, any audit failures
that occur should be due to isolated break
downs or “people problems,” and not to
inherent deficiencies in firms’ systems of
quality control.4

The Committee consists of nine experienced
auditors, some retired and some still active, whose
work complements and supplements the peer
review process.

Confidentiality of Committee Activities
When the Special Investigations Committee
was formed, it was recognized that any public dis
closure of its activities regarding a particular firm
or case could be used to the prejudice of that firm.
This could be unfair to the firm because the pur
pose of the Committee’s action (i.e., to improve
the quality of audits) would be quite different
from that of litigation (i.e., to ascertain fault and
4 Securities and Exchange Commission, Annual Report, 1982, U.S. Govern
ment Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.

impose liability). Moreover, the proceedings of
the Committee ordinarily would not result in
authoritative findings of fact based on study of all
the facts. As a result, the authorization document
establishing the Committee required that all its
activities be performed in strict confidence. Meet
ings of the Committee are open only to assigned
AICPA staff members and representatives of the
Public Oversight Board. Workpapers are destroyed
after they have served their purposes in the Com
mittee’s decision-making process and oversight is
complete. No publicity of any kind is given to any
of the Committee’s activities. This policy of confi
dentiality does not restrict the effectiveness of the
Committee in carrying out its intended purpose.
Allegations of audit failure in litigation or
regulatory proceedings unavoidably raise ques
tions about the adequacy of a firm’s system of
quality control. Whether the allegations are well
founded or not, the mere existence of such charges
requires the attention of those concerned with
that firm’s quality controls. Provision for the in
vestigation of allegations of audit failure is included
in the m em bership requirem ents of the SEC
Practice Section. Member firms must promptly
report each instance of litigation or other regulatory
proceeding against the firm or any of its person
nel, involving clients that are SEC registrants alleg
ing deficiencies in the conduct of an audit or
reporting thereon in a filing under the federal
securities laws. Although the Committee currently
does not have jurisdiction under its charter for
allegations involving entities that are not SEC
registrants, the Executive Committee can require
a member firm to comply with the Committee’s
request for information if the Committee feels
such allegations require investigation. To date,
the Executive Committee has not had to take such
action because member firms have voluntarily
complied with all requests of the Committee.5
Allegations made in litigation may or may
5

In Ju n e 1984, the SECPS Review Committee, a committee appoin
ted by the Chairman of the AICPA to review the structure, opera
tions, and effectiveness of the SEC Practice Section, issued its
report, recommending, among other things, that the membership
requirement for reporting cases to the Committee be extended to
cover cases involving all entities in which there is a significant
public interest.
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not have any foundation in fact If valid, they
may imply deficiencies in the firm’s system of
quality control or in professional literature, or
they may imply a failure by the firm’s personnel
to carry out their assigned duties in a pro
fessional manner.
The possibilities with respect to a set of alle
gations are several and varied. From the stand
point of quality control:
1. They may be based on misunderstanding
by the plaintiff of accounting and/or audit
ing standards.
2. They may represent a failure attributable
to the independent accountants----a. Because of a personnel deficiency.
b. Because of a systems deficiency.
3. They may indicate the need for recon
sideration of professional standards.
If the charges are determined to represent a
misunderstanding of accounting and/or auditing
standards, the case is closed. If it appears that
there may have been a failure by specific mem
bers of the firm’s professional staff to follow estab
lished policies and procedures, rather than weak
nesses in the firm’s system of quality control, the
Committee considers whether corrective action
taken by the firm is appropriate to guard against
the possibility of a future failure. However, it will
leave the task of fixing responsibility and punish
ment to the courts and regulatory bodies which
are much better equipped to do so.
If the Committee identifies system weak
nesses as a result of its investigative procedures
and these have already been eliminated by cor
rective action taken by the firm, the case will be
closed. If weaknesses in the firm’s system of quality
control have not yet been corrected, recommen
dations for improvement will be discussed with
the firm. If agreement cannot be reached with the
firm on appropriate improvements in the system,
the facts will be reported to the Executive Com
mittee for appropriate action, which might involve
the imposition of sanctions.
Chart E depicts the process of investigation
of allegations by the Committee. The Board has
complete access to all Committee files and actively
monitors the Committee’s decisions on individual
cases. The Board’s staff reads all pertinent docu
ments, financial information, and correspon
dence related to reported cases. Summaries of
each case are distributed to Board members and
serve as a basis for discussion at Board meetings.
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Representatives of the Board attend all Commit
tee meetings and, at the Board’s discretion, meet
ings between firm representatives and Committee
members, as described below.

The Investigative Process
For each reported case, the member firm is
required to provide the Committee’s staff with
copies of the complaint, relevant financial state
ments, SEC or other regulatory filings, and, upon
request, other public documents such as special
reports of bankruptcy trustees. As part of its regular
duties, the Committee’s staff reads the financial
press and business and SEC publications for re
ports of alleged audit failures. In this manner, the
staff usually becomes aware of matters to be re
ported before member firms formally report them
and identifies alleged audit failures involving nonSEC registrants that may have significant public
interest. The staff prepares a summary of such
documents, identifying the accounting, auditing,
and quality control issues involved, and includes
a summary of or references to relevant pro
fessional literature. The staff summary and copies
of the documents are supplied to all Committee
members.
At the Committee meeting following the re
porting of a case, a task force of one or two Com
mittee members is appointed to consider the alle
gations and relevant documents and to recom
mend what other investigative procedures should
be applied.
The task force carefully(l) reviews all mate
rials relevant to the case such as the complaint,
the financial statements, and filings with the SEC
and other regulatory agencies; (2) considers the
results of the most recent peer review; and (3)
reads available public information ranging from
newspaper articles to court documents. The task
force reports on its activities at each Committee
meeting.
In some instances, a thoughtful reading of
the complaint and related financial statements
permits the task force to conclude that the allega
tions are without merit and that no further action
by the Committee is warranted. For example, this
conclusion might follow when the complaint al
leges inadequate financial statement disclosures
although all required disclosures are clearly evi
dent from a reading of the statements. However, a
decision to close a case requires formal action by
the Committee, an action which the Committee
does not take lightly. The task force proposing
such an action presents supporting facts and rea

soning to the Committee and is often questioned
at some length. Even though a majority of the
Committee may agree with the task force’s recom
mendation, it is not unusual for the Committee to
defer action on a recommendation to close a case
and to ask the task force to obtain additional
information regarding some aspect of the charges.
The task force may decide that it needs addi
tional information in the course of its work or, as
indicated above, the Committee may require that
additional information be obtained. Conferences
with representatives of the firm and with the cap
tain or members of the latest peer review team are
common means of obtaining such information.
The specifics of each case influence the kinds of
information sought in such conferences, but the
most commonly requested information includes:
■ The firm’s general assessment of the allegations and
its basis for such assessment.
■ The current responsibilities of the partner(s) and
m anager(s) who supervised the audit engagement
involved in the litigation.
■ Whether the audit team on the engagement sought
consultation with others within the firm regarding
matters that are the subject of the litigation.
■ Current policies and procedures regarding aspects
of the quality control system challenged by the
litigation.
■ Whether the office issuing the report in question
had recently been subjected to (a) peer review or (b)
the firm’s internal inspection program, and, if so,
whether the work of the supervisory personnel in
volved in the engagement under litigation had been
subjected to review or inspection.
■ The nature and scope of supervision and guidance
in specialized industries, if relevant to the case.
■ The issues underlying matters mentioned in a peer
review report or letter of comments.

After thorough consideration of the infor
mation gathered, the Committee decides if there
appears a need to continue or expand its inquiry.
In a significant num ber of cases, the information
gathered through the procedures described above
has enabled the Committee to conclude that the
case can be closed.
Moreover, in a num ber of cases, the Com
mittee learns that the firm itself has already reviewed
the matter, and, if desirable or necessary, has
strengthened or emphasized relevant quality con
trol policies and procedures and/or reassigned
certain responsibilities. In large measure, experi
ence to date has provided convincing evidence
that private regulation by individual firms is effec

tive in implementing timely and appropriate cor
rective action—that is, once litigation or some
other proceeding alerts a firm to possible weak
nesses, it acts on its own initiative to discover and
correct any deficiency in its quality control system.

Monitoring
When the Committee decides that relevant
additional information may be forthcoming, a
case may be placed in monitoring to await the
results of certain activities then in process. In
effect, monitoring represents an extension of time
to complete the investigation, an extension made
necessary by indications that additional informa
tion may become available. For example, the
Committee may decide that the input from the
results of a firm’s then in-process peer review or
the imminent report of a bankruptcy trustee may
be relevant to deciding the Committee’s future
course of action. The Committee may also decide
to keep the case in monitoring status until it can
evaluate the effectiveness of relevant corrective
actions by the firm. As further information be
comes available, the task force assigned to the
case will generally discuss these developments
with representatives of the m em ber firm or the
peer review team.

Special Reviews
The Committee’s concern with a specific set
of allegations always runs to their possible impli
cations with respect to the firm’s system of quality
control, not to the validity of the allegations in the
case. The Section recognizes that the courts, the
SEC, and others which possess relevant statutory
powers will ultimately decide the merits of the
allegations and impose a formal penalty, if one is
called for. The Committee’s responsibility is to
gain assurance that the firm remedies any defi
ciencies in its quality control system or in its com
pliance with that system that might lead to future
failures.
When the Committee concludes that the
allegations may be indicative of unsatisfactory
quality controls or unsatisfactory compliance, it
calls for a special review of one or more aspects of
the firm’s quality control system. This has occurred,
to date, in five cases involving four different firms.
Note that this is a special review in addition to the
required triennial peer review. A special review
differs from a peer review in that it is typically less
extensive and more intensive. The special review
generally is directed at those elements of quality
control implied by the allegations to have deficien
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CHART E

A c tiv itie s o f S p e c ia l In v e s tig a tio n s C o m m itte e

Reporting Phase and Summary
of issues by Committee Staff
Member firm reports litigation
to Special Investigations
Committee

Member firm provides copies
of complaints, SEC filings and
releases, financial statements
and other pertinent public
documents

Staff reviews submitted
material and relevant
professional literature

Initial Investigative Procedures
Task force
analyzes staff
summary and
public
documents

Does
nature of
allegations
raise questions
about firm ’s
quality control
system?

No

Committee appoints task force
to analyze case

Meet with
firm ’s
representatives
to discuss
allegations,
personnel
involved, firm's
quality control
policies and
procedures

Does
individual’s per
formance
raise questions
as to future
compliance with
quality
controls?

Consider need
to meet with
firm ’s peer
reviewers to
corroborate
firm's
responses and
discuss peer
review findings

ls
there
possible
uncorrected
deficiency in
firm ’s quality
control
sys
tem?

Consider need
for special
review and
refer to
Professional
Ethics Division

Yes

Consider
need for
special
review

No

Is
there
possibility
of future
significant
develop
ments?

No
Close
Case
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Do
allegations
raise questions
about adequacy of
professional
standards?

Yes

Consider need
to monitor
developments

No

Close
Case

Yes

No

Close
Case

Communicate
concerns to
appropriate
standard-setting
body

Monitor actions of
standard-setting
body

Yes
To Initial
Investigative
Procedures

No

Yes

Yes

Staff summarizes relevant
allegations, issues, and
prepares recommendations for
Committee action

Do
allegations
raise questions
about an
individual’s
perfor
mance?

Close
Case

CHART E

C o n tin u e d

Monitoring Phase

Special Review Phase

Committee determines scope of and approach
to special review

From
Initial Investigative Procedures

Committee decides appropriate course of action

Peer reviewers
asked to include
selected segments
of firm ’s practice
in upcoming peer
review

Special review performed of identified areas of
firm's quality control system*

Monitor future
developments in
the case
Do
results
indicate need
for corrective
action?

No

Close
Case

Peer reviewers
perform review

Yes

Will
firm
implement
appropriate
corrective
actions?

Are

peer
review
results
satisfactory?

Yes

Close
Case

Recommend
sanction be
imposed

Yes

No
Evaluate new
information to
assess likelihood
of future audit
failures

Evaluate and
monitor firm's
corrective action
plan

Is

there
likelihood
of future
audit
failures?

No

Yes

To
Special
Review

Yes

Is
there
likelihood
of future
audit
failures?

Evaluate and
monitor firm ’s
corrective action
plan

Has
firm
effectively
implemented
corrective
action
plan?

No

Recommend
sanction be
imposed

No

No

Yes
Close
Case

Close
Case

Close
Case

* Process more intensive and less extensive than that of
regular triennial peer review; principally focuses on specific
offices, individual industries, or auditing issues.
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cies. Depending on the nature of the allegations,
the special review may focus on the work of specific
practice offices, of specific partners or staff mem
bers, or on engagements of clients in a specific
industry.
In each review of the four firms required to
undergo special reviews of selected aspects of
their quality control systems, the special review
team was supervised by the Committee’s assigned
task force. The reviews of three firms focused on
the performance of audits in a specific industry
and in designated offices by specific individuals.
The review of the fourth firm was directed at
audits of significant SEC registrants performed
by specific practice offices; special attention was
directed to selected key audit aspects of the en
gagements selected.
The workpapers and reports of the special
review teams were reviewed by the task force. The
results of each review were reported in detail to
the Committee. Two of the special reviews resulted
in the conclusion that each firm’s quality controls
were appropriate, that relevant policies and pro
cedures were being complied with, but that in
certain offices audit procedures and the basis for
conclusions reached were not always fully docu
mented. In each case, the firm had discussed the
findings of the special review team with personnel
of the offices concerned and reemphasized the
need for compliance with the firm’s documentation
standards. Accordingly, the Committee closed its
files on both cases.
The special review of the third firm did not
uncover any deficiencies in its quality control sys
tem or any significant instances of noncom
pliance by its personnel with established policies
and procedures. The Committee closed the case.
The special review of the fourth firm dis
closed that compliance with the firm’s quality
control policies and procedures in one of the
offices reviewed was not satisfactory. On dis
covering this, the firm developed a comprehen
sive corrective action plan for improving the quality
of performance in that office. The plan was con
sidered adequate by the Committee. Neverthe
less, the Committee directed the peer review team
then planning the firm’s regularly scheduled re
view to include that specific office in the review
and to assess the effectiveness of the corrective
action plan. The case remains in monitoring status
pending the Committee’s determination that the
corrective action plan has achieved its objectives.
The involvement of the Board in special re
views is similar to that of its involvement in peer
reviews. For example, the task force’s workpapers
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and report are reviewed in detail by the Board’s
staff; Board and staff members attend meetings
between firm representatives and review team
members; Board and staff members attend Com
mittee meetings at which the findings of and the
report of the task force are presented for accep
tance; and the result of each special review is dis
cussed at Board meetings.

Effects of Private Regulation
The fact that the Committee has seen the
need to require only four special reviews is attri
butable to the effective role played by private
regulation. Often the need for a special review is
made unnecessary by positive actions taken by
the firm on its own initiative, as illustrated by the
following case.
In response to inquiries made in connection
with certain litigation, the Committee was informed
that the firm had begun an extensive and inten
sive intrafirm review (i.e., inspection) of engage
ments performed by the firm in a specific industry.
As a result of its special internal inspection pro
gram, among other things, the firm (1) established
new requirements for the extent of involvement
of independent preissuance reviewers for future
audits of clients in that industry, (2) established
more extensive consultation procedures with re
spect to performance of audits of clients in that
industry, and (3) designed and presented addi
tional training courses for all supervisory person
nel assigned to audits of clients in that industry.
The task force reviewed the report and support
ing workpapers of the inspection team and the
resulting modification of the firm’s quality con
trol policies and procedures and concluded that
no further action was required. The Committee
concurred.
Other cases have been closed for similar
reasons. Actions taken by firms and found to con
stitute a sufficient basis for the Committee to
close its files include: (a) transfer of personnel
and reassignment of responsibilities, (b) expan
sion of review procedures, including preissuance
review of audit workpapers, (c) modifying scope
of inspection program to include selected offices
named in litigation, and (d) disseminating specific
guidance material.

Summary of Bases for Cases Closed
Provisions of the charter creating the Special
Investigations Committee preclude the public re
porting of detailed information about individual

cases reported to the Committee. Because the
Committee does not reach a conclusive deter
mination of the merits of an allegation of audit
failure, publication of its actions with respect to
specific issues could result in unwarranted, sub
stantial prejudice to member firms or their per
sonnel. However, Table 5, which summarizes the
actions taken and conclusions reached by the
Committee, may provide some insight as to the
quality of decisions reached.

Reevaluation of Professional Standards
While the major task of the Committee is to
investigate each set of allegations made against a
member firm in the course of litigation, the Com
mittee also performs another very useful function
that benefits both the public and the profession.
The nature of the Committee’s work enables it to
analyze and evaluate the implications for current
professional standards of each piece of litigation
that comes before it. It unavoidably asks the ques
tion on each case: “ Does the information in this
case imply that current professional literature
does not provide adequate technical guidance on
this matter?”
In a real sense, the Committee’s analysis serves
as an early warning system to identify matters
requiring the attention of those charged with the
responsibility of considering the need for new
standards or the reconsideration of existing ones.
The Committee has filled this valuable role a
number of times in its rather brief history, and
has drawn attention to accounting or auditing
problems in three specialized industries. For ex

ample, the Committee suggested that the AICPA’s
Bank Audit Guide provide further guidance con
cerning procedures to determine the appropriate
carrying value of securities whose market value is
significantly below cost.
TABLE 5

Sum m ary o f Actions Taken and
Conclusions R eached by the Special
Investigations Com m ittee Concerning
Closed Cases
N um b er o f Cases Closed
from Inception to
June 30, 1984

The allegations misstated the requirements of
professional standards or the case did not indicate a
need for changes in the firm’s quality control system or
for other corrective m easures............................................

66

Appropriate AICPA technical bodies were asked to
consider the need for changes in or additional guidance
on professional standards...................................................

9

The case was referred to the AICPA Professional Ethics
Division for an investigation into the work of a specific
individual ...............................................................................

2

A special review or an expansion of the firm’s regularly
scheduled forthcoming peer review was m a d e ..............

6

The firm took appropriate corrective action that was
responsive to the implications of the specific case . . . .

10
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O ther Membership Requirements
A firm may join the SEC Practice Section by sub
mitting an application for membership and agree
ing to abide by the membership requirements.
The requirements of membership are many and
diverse.6 Several of them are described at length
in other sections of this report, such as the trien
nial peer review and the need to report certain
litigation alleging audit failure by the firm or any
of its members. The requirements of members
are reproduced in an appendix to this report, but
several of them are worthy of special note:
1. The engagement partner charged with
the responsibility of supervising the audit
of an SEC registrant can serve in that capa
city for no more than seven consecutive
years. This requirement is waived for firms
with fewer than five SEC audit clients and
fewer than ten partners.
2. Every audit report of an SEC registrant
must be subjected to a preissuance review
by a partner other than the partner in
charge of the audit engagement.
3. A member firm is required to maintain
minimum amounts and types of accoun
tants’ liability insurance, which amounts
are in direct proportion to its size.

6 Membership requirements o f the Private Companies Practice Sec
tion are similar to those of the SEC Practice Section. The major dif
ference is that the SEC Practice Section has additional requirements
that apply only to audits of SEC registrants.
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4. A member firm is required to report to
the audit committee or board of directors
of each SEC audit client on the nature of
disagreements with management of the
client on financial accounting and report
ing matters and auditing procedures which,
if not satisfactorily resolved, would have
caused the issuance of a qualified opinion
on the financial statements of the client.
Peer review teams use special procedures to
ascertain whether the firm is complying with each
membership requirement If the review team con
cludes that the firm is not in substantial com
pliance with the membership requirements, it
issues a modified report on the peer review, which,
as indicated earlier, is placed in the public file.

Oversight of the
Self-Regulatory Process
The Role of the Public Oversight Board
The Public Oversight Board is a five-member
board established to represent the public interest
in the Section’s self-regulatory process. It has
entry to all meetings of all committees and task
forces of the Section and access to all workpapers,
reports, and other documents.
The Board’s primary function is to monitor
and comment on the Section’s activities. From
the beginning, the Board has taken the position
that if the self- regulatory program is to be success
ful, all authority must be vested in the profession
itself. The Board does not have line authority and
does not desire it.
Individual Board members are assigned liai
son responsibilities with each of the Section’s
committees. Members of the Board and/or its
staff attend all committee meetings of the Sec
tion, and most meetings of its task forces.
The Board publishes an annual report as of
June 30 each year summarizing its activities and
reporting on the activities of the Section. The
Board also occasionally publishes special reports
as it deems necessary or desirable.7

Oversight by the SEC
The SEC independently evaluates the peer
review process including the effectiveness of Board
oversight. The SEC inspects a sample of peer
reviewer workpapers and Board oversight workpapers under an arrangement agreed to by the
Section. All workpapers are masked so as not to
reveal the identity of individual clients. Under a

7

1982 modification of that arrangement, workpapers relating to firms with fewer than ten SEC
clients are masked to conceal the identity of the
firm in order to further reduce the possibility of
client identification.
The SEC continues to have a high level of
interest in the program and has actively supported
it by both constructive suggestion and public
endorsement Based, on its inspection of the peer
review process, as described above, the SEC has
expressed satisfaction with the process and the
effectiveness of the Board’s oversight procedures
with respect thereto.
The Board and its staff meet periodically
with the chairman and staff members of the SEC
to discuss the various aspects of the self-regulatory
program. In these meetings, operating under the
privacy requirement imposed on the special in
vestigative process, the Section and the Board
have attempted to provide sufficient information
to the SEC so as to permit it to have confidence in
the effectiveness of the process and the Board’s
oversight thereof. However, the SEC believes that
it needs additional information to reach an inde
pendent conclusion regarding the special inves
tigative process. Exploratory discussions attempting
to resolve this matter are continuing between the
Section, the SEC, and the Board.

In March 1979, the Board published its report, Scope of Services by
CPA Firms based on its findings of a two-day public hearing and
numerous written comments from persons both within and out
side the profession.
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Conclusion
As noted in the introduction, professional
regulation is a complex process in which three
“authorities” participate, the government, the
profession, and the firm. The Board has come to
realize that the most substantial, and certainly the
least recognized, force for improvement of pro
fessional performance is private regulation, the
discipline imposed by management of individual
firms as they strive to meet the demands of com
petition and to comply with or exceed pro
fessional standards.
Professional standards, established at the
second level of professional regulation, have a
direct impact on the discipline maintained within
firms.
The Board has reviewed the accounting pro
fession’s program for audit quality, described in
this report, both conceptually and in practice.
The profession’s quality control standards, peer
reviews of firms’ compliance with those stan
dards, and the supporting strength of the special
investigative process, with both public and regula
tory oversight, combine to provide a sound, com
prehensive, and effective assurance of audit
quality.
The Board is aware that many responsible
and respected members of the business and edu
cational communities tend to view self-regulation
as a replacement for government regulation. Their
comments and criticisms, as well as the Board’s
experiences in working with the AICPA program,
have led the Board to reconsider both the objec
tives and limitations of professional regulation.
The Board is convinced that professional
regulation is needed in a free enterprise society,
that it makes a significant contribution to the
smooth and successful operation of business acti
vity. The essence of professionalism is a personal
commitment to excellence. Yet, important as per
sonal commitment is, it is not enough; more must
be provided. The committed individual needs
education, encouragement, and knowledge of
how others in the profession respond to various
situations, opportunities, and contingencies. A
dedicated professional also needs to be mindful
of the surveillance by government in order to
resist the temptations that occasionally arise.
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Thus, rules, regulations, guides, and enforced
discipline are needed to fortify and strengthen
personal commitment. The individual prac
titioner, the firm, fellow practitioners united in
professional organizations, and government, all
are a part of a structure that provides satisfactory
professional services to society at a competitive
price.
The Board finds a continuing dedication to
improvement on the part of accounting firms that
are members of the Section. Participation in peer
reviews has introduced reviewers as well as those
reviewed to new policies, procedures, and ideas
that improve performance. These are quickly
adopted and absorbed into their own practices.
The Board has observed that, above all, the peer
review process is a remarkably effective means of
continuing professional development. Pro
fessional self-regulation, as the Board sees it work
ing in the Section’s program, is but one part of
professional regulation in the broad sense. It can
not and should not seek to replace or to emulate
either public regulation or private regulation.
Nor should either of these other two levels of
regulation attempt to take over the role that peer
regulation fills so well. The establishment of pro
fessional standards of accounting, auditing, and
quality control, the work of the AICPA Ethics
Division, the educational programs of the AICPA
and the state societies, the peer review program of
the Division for CPA Firms, and investigations of
alleged audit failures by the SEC Practice Section
are all effective components of the profession’s
self-regulatory activities and should be accepted
as such.
As long as these diverse forces continue to be
effective, we can look forward to continuing im
provement in the quality of professional auditing
in this country.

Appendix
Excerpt from Section IV, Membership, of the
SECPS Manual

3. Requirements of Members
Member firms shall be obligated to abide by the
following:
a. Ensure that a majority of members of the firms
are CPAs, that the firm can legally engage in the
practice of public accounting, and that each pro
prietor, shareholder, or partner of the firm resi
dent in the United States and eligible for AICPA
membership is a member of the AICPA.
b. Adhere to quality control standards established
by the AICPA Quality Control Standards Com
mittee.
c. Submit to peer reviews of the firm’s account
ing and audit practice every three years or at such
additional times as designated by the executive
committee, the reviews to be conducted in accor
dance with review standards established by the
section’s peer review committee.
d. Ensure that all professionals in the firm resi
dent in the United States, including CPAs and
non-CPAs, take part in qualifying continuing pro
fessional education as follows:
(1) Participate in at least one hundred twenty
hours every three years, but not less than
twenty hours every year, or
(2) Comply with mandatory continuing pro
fessional education requirements for state
licensing or for state society membership,
provided such state or society requirements
require an average of forty hours per year
of continuing professional education for
each reporting period, and provided each
professional in the firm participates in at
least twenty hours every year.
e. Assign a new audit partner to be in charge of
each SEC engagement that has had another audit
partner-in-charge for a period of seven consecu
tive years, and prohibit such incumbent partner
from returning to in-charge status on the engage
ment for a minimum of two years except as follows:
(1) This requirement does not apply to mem
ber firms that have less than five SEC audit
clients and less than 10 partners.

(2) An audit partner who has been the audit
partner-in-charge of an SEC audit client
for seven consecutive years may continue
to serve in that capacity for audits for periods
ending within two years from the date the
firm becomes a member, or within two
years from the date the firm no longer quali
fies for the exemption in (1) above, which
ever is later.
(3) An application for relief is granted by the
peer review committee on the basis of un
usual circumstances.
f. Ensure that a concurring review of the audit
report by a partner other than the audit partnerin-charge of an SEC engagement is required before
issuance of an audit report on the financial state
ments of an SEC registrant.The peer review com
mittee may authorize alternative procedures where
this requirement cannot be met because of the
size of the member firm.
g. File with the section for each fiscal year of the
United States firm (covering offices maintained in
the United States and its territories) the following
information, within ninety days of the end of such
fiscal year, to be open to public inspection.
( 1) Form of business entity (e.g., partnership
or corporation) and identification of
domestic affiliates rendering services to
clients.
( 2) [Deleted]
( 3) Number and location of offices.
( 4) Total num ber of partners and non-CPAs
with parallel status within the firm’s organ
ization structure.
( 5) Total num ber of CPAs (including part
ners).
( 6) Total number of professional staff (includ
ing partners).
( 7) Total number of personnel (including item
6, above).
( 8) Number of SEC clients for which the firm
is principal auditor-of-record.
( 9) [Deleted]
(10) A statement indicating that the firm has
complied with AICPA and SEC indepen
dence requirements.
(11) Disclosure regarding pending litigation
as required under generally accepted ac
counting principles and indicating whether
such pending litigation is expected to have
a material effect on the firm’s financial
condition or its ability to serve clients.
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(12) Gross fees for accounting and auditing,
tax, and MAS, expressed as a percentage
of total gross fees.
(13) Gross fees for both MAS and tax services
performed for SEC audit clients, expressed
as a percentage of total fees charged to all
SEC audit clients.
(14) Names of firms merged or acquired dur
ing the year and included in year-end
numbers reported above and the number
of offices, accounting and auditing per
sonnel, and SEC clients of the acquired
firm that were—
(i) Combined with practice units of the
acquiring firm, or
(ii) Continued as separate practice units
in the combined firm.
(15) Fees for MAS Services performed for SEC
audit clients, expressed as a percentage of
audit fees charged to SEC clients, pre
pared in the following m anner
Range of MAS Fees
to Audit Fees for
SEC Audit Clients

Number of
SEC
Audit Clients

0-25%
26-50%
51-100%
Over 100%
Total num ber of
SEC audit clients

The total num ber of SEC audit clients re
ported in this summary shall agree with the
number reported pursuant to the require
ments of section IV 3g (8). The firm shall
also report how many of the num ber of
SEC audit clients included in the “over
100%” category fell into that category for
three consecutive years, including the cur
rent year.
h. Maintain such minimum amounts and types
of accountants’ liability insurance as shall be pre
scribed from time to time by the executive com
mittee.
i. Adhere to the portions of the AICPA Code of
Professional Ethics and Statements on Standards
for Management Advisory Services dealing with
independence in performing management advisory
services for audit clients whose securities are regis
tered with the SEC. Refrain from performing for
such clients services that are inconsistent with the
firm’s responsibilities to the public or that consist
of the following types of services:
(1) Psychological testing.
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(2) Public opinion polls.
(3) Merger and acquisition assistance for a fin
der' s fee.
(4) Executive recruitm ent as described in
Appendix A.
(5) Actuarial services to insurance companies
as described in Appendix A.
j. Report annually to the audit committee or board
of directors (or its equivalent in a partnership) of
each SEC audit client on the total fees received
from the client for management advisory services
during the year under audit and a description of
the types of such services rendered.
k. Report to the audit committee or board of
directors (or its equivalent in a partnership) of
each SEC audit client on financial accounting and
reporting matters and auditing procedures which,
if not satisfactorily resolved, would have caused
the issuance of a qualified opinion on the client’s
financial statements.
l. Pay dues as established by the executive com
mittee and comply with the rules and regulations
of the section, as established from time to time by
the executive committee, and with the decisions
of the executive committee in respect of matters
within its competence; in connection with their
duties including disciplinary proceedings, cooperate
with the peer review committee and the special
investigations committee established by resolu
tion of the executive committee as set out in the
Appendix B hereto; and comply with any sanction
that may be imposed by the executive committee.
m. Report to the special investigations commit
tee, within thirty days of service on the firm or its
personnel of the first pleading in the matter or
within thirty days of joining the section, if later,
any litigation (including criminal indictments)
against it or its personnel, or any proceeding or
investigation publicly announced by a regula
tory agency, commenced on or after November 1,
1979 (not including additional proceedings aris
ing out of or related to facts involved in litigation
originally filed prior to November 1, 1979), that
involves clients or former clients that are SEC
registrants and that alleges deficiencies in the
conduct of an audit or reporting thereon in con
nection with any required filing under the federal
securities laws. With respect to matters previously
reported under this subparagraph, member firms
shall report to the committee additional pro
ceedings, settlements, court decisions on sub
stantive issues, and the filing of appeals within
thirty days of their occurrence.
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